Abstract Quantum secure direct communication protocols offer confidential transmission of classic information over quantum channel without prior key agreement. The ping-pong based protocols provide asymptotic security and detailed analysis of security level provided by each variant of the protocol is required. The paper presents a general method of calculation of the eavesdropped information as a function of the attack detection probability. The method is applied to the ping-pong protocol based on completely entangled pairs of qudits. The upper and lower bounds on the amount of the leaked information and eavesdropping detection probability are provided.
Introduction
The research in quantum cryptography, mainly motivated by the promise of provable security based on the laws of physics, is intensively continued since the seminal paper of Bennet and Brassard [4] . The first proposals [4, 12] addressed the problem of quantum key distribution (QKD). The QKD protocols are supposed to fill in the gap appeared after publication of Shor's algorithm [21] , which is able to break Rivest, Shamir, Adleman (RSA) cryptosystem [20] in polynomial time [27, 28] . However, information resulting from QKD execution is not determined by either of parties but is settled by the protocol completion itself, thus protocols of this kind are not suitable for direct communication and have to be combined with classic cryptography. Moreover, in QKD protocols, quantum communication must be assisted by classic P. Zawadzki (B) Institute of Electronics, Silesian University of Technology, Akademicka 16, 44-100 Gliwice, Poland e-mail: Piotr.Zawadzki@polsl.pl privacy amplification algorithms which diminish eavesdropper knowledge about the key under agreement at the price of quantum resources wasting. In effect the information throughput in QKD protocols is low.
Quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) protocols are designed for classic information transfer over a quantum channel. They provide unidirectional communication in which information content is specified by the sender. The first QSDC protocol, based on a single photon transmission, was proposed by Beige et al. [2] . Later, Boström and Felbinger [5] proposed the ping-pong protocol based on EPR pairs. Since then many enhancements and modifications of the ping-pong protocol paradigm have been published including superdense coding [7] , usage of GHZ states for two [13] and multiparty [8] communication, and variants based on higher dimensional systems i.e. qutrits [1, 24] and qudits [11] . The original protocol is provably asymptotically secure in case of a perfect quantum channel [5] , and although it has been successfully attacked for noisy channels [25, 29] , there exist simple countermeasures that restore its security [6] . The security of ping-pong protocol based on GHZ states [22] and qutrits [23] has been studied too. It has been shown that their security properties are very similar to the original version except for multiparty variants which are vulnerable to double CNOT attack [26] .
The ping-pong protocol derivatives that utilize transmission of signal particles by blocks provide better security characteristics [18, 24] . But protocols of that kind require quantum memory registers-the technique which is not fully developed in present photonic technology [10] . Protocol asymptotic security may be also improved by some additional message processing analogous to privacy amplification in QKD protocols [9, 15] . Thus, the variants based on the original version of the protocol are much closer to experimental implementation [19] . However, the general case of the ping-pong protocol based on pairs of maximally entangled qudits has not been in depth analyzed yet [24] . The aim of this paper is to fill in this gap. The approach presented here is a generalization of the methods presented in [5, 23] . The method is applied to the variant with a superdense information coding and an eavesdropping detection performed in a computational basis or two mutually unbiased bases (MUB) [3] . It is proved that the considered protocol is insecure, i.e. eavesdropper can gain some information without being detected, when control mode is executed only in a computational base and asymptotically secure when two MUBs are used. Moreover, the optimal detection strategy is designed. Closed form expressions that relate the minimum attack detection probability and the maximum leaked information to the qudit size are also provided for that case.
The ping-pong protocol in short
In the provided protocol description, Alice and Bob are legitimate parties and Eve is a malicious eavesdropper. The ping-pong protocol operates in two modes. In the message mode Alice sends information to Bob, while in the control mode the communicating parties check for the presence of the eavesdropper. The communication process is started by Bob, the recipient of information, who prepares two maximally entangled qudits. Without loss of generality it may be assumed that it is in the state [11] 
One of the qudits, denoted as "home", is kept confidential, while the the second one, named the "travel", is send to Alice. Alice randomly selects message mode or control mode. In the message mode she applies one of the unitary transformations to the travel qudit [16, 24] 
where summation within a ket is performed mod N . The message is encoded in α, β = 0, . . . , N − 1 so Alice can encode 2 log 2 (N ) bits per one protocol cycle. The entanglement of qudits causes that Alice's local operations have non local effects. The state composed from home and travel qudits is transformed into another maximally entangled state |ψ α,β . Next, the transformed qudit is send back to Bob, who performs collective measurement on both qudits. There exists one-to-one correspondence between state detected by Bob and values of α and β, so Bob can decode information sent by Alice. However, such scheme can be attacked by an eavesdropping Eve. Although the travel qudit looks for her as maximally mixed, she can attach, according to the dilation theorem [14] , an ancilla system of dimension N 2 that purifies the travel qudit. She can than entangle the qudit with the ancilla by some unitary operation. Because of the introduced entanglement the encoding operations U α,β of Alice also transform the ancilla system. However, Eve's eavesdropping introduces transmission errors as a side effect, which are perceived by Alice and Bob as noise.
The special control mode is used for an eavesdropping detection. Alice switches to control mode in some randomly selected protocol cycles. In this mode she measures the received travel qudit in one of mutually unbiased bases. The fact of switching into control mode and the measurement basis are announced via public classic channel. It is assumed that although public information is accessible to Eve, she can't control its content. Bob subsequently measures the home qudit in the same basis and asks Alice to reveal the value of her measurement. Because of the fragile entanglement of the two-qudit system the result of Bob's measurement is fully determined by the information about the used basis and value obtained by Alice. Any deviation from that correlation indicates the presence of Eve.
Security analysis
Eve sees the travel qudit as a maximally mixed state, so without loss of generality it can be replaced by the state [5] 
The best she can do is to entangle the qudit with the ancilla system and infer some information about encoding transformation from the measurement of the composite system. However, any mixed state in the basic space of dim (H ) may be treated as the partial trace of the pure state living in space with attached ancilla of size dim
The operation A introducing entanglement between travel qudit and the ancilla system is unitary and may be described as
where the |φ s,l denote Eve's probe states. There exist exactly N such states for each |s so Eve has to use N 2 probes. The state of the travel qudit and the attached ancilla after Alice's encoding operation takes the form
Lets assume that encoding operations used by Alice are equally probable and consider the attack on state |0 . The resulted density matrix is of the form
There exist N 2 vectors |k + β |φ 0,k , but fixing β selects the subspace spanned by N vectors. It follows that density matrix of size N 2 × N 2 may be factorized into N submatrices of size N × N . Moreover each of those matrices is diagonal. The maximal mutual information I AE between Alice and Eve is limited by the Holevo bound
But, by the assumption about construction of the ancilla system, the states |ψ 
However, each eigenvalue is N -fold degenerate and
where identity N −1 k=0 a k,0 2 = 1 has been used. It is worth to note that
is a non-detection probability when control mode is executed in computational basis. The equations (9) and (10) represent opposed interests of the Eve: she has to choose the attack operation in which the non-detection probability and the mutual information I AE are maximized.
Results
Information accessible to Eve as a function of a non-detection probability was numerically computed using (9) and (10) for randomly generated unitary matrices representing an attack operator A. Results obtained for N = 3, 4, 5 are illustrated on Fig. 1 . But before delving into an analysis of the numerical results it is reasonable to consider two canonical attack operations. Suppose that Eve is able to construct an unitary transformation such that
where p represents a non-detection probability. In this case the mutual information between Alice and Eve equals to
In the second scenario let the detection probability will be spread over all probe states
In such situation
The curves (12) and (14) are also shown on Fig. 1 . It is immediately visible that they represent lower and upper bound of information accessible to the eavesdropper. The maximal information available to Eve is equal to the channel capacity 2 log 2 N . In this case the non-detection probability equals to 1/N i.e. for larger N the attack providing maximal possible information is detected with higher probability. If Eve implements attacks that are harder to detect then mutual information is diminished. In the limiting case when Eve is totally hidden ( p = 1) she has knowledge about a half of the transmission content. It is also visible that randomly selected attack transformations are concentrated around the point in which Eve gets most information but is detected with high probability. The results presented herein are in perfect agreement with the analysis of the qutrit based protocol presented in [23] . It immediately follows that all qudit based ping-pong protocols that use superdense coding and an eavesdropping detection only in the computational basis are not secure because in this case Eve has an access to at least a half of the message content. Alice and Bob may improve detection capabilities if they perform control measurements in more than one base. In this case Alice must also announce the basis in which control measurement was performed. However, the basis selected by Alice cannot be arbitrary. It is also desirable, that an attack not detected in one of the bases would induce a maximal disturbance in the other one. Such situation takes place if the bases are mutually unbiased (MUB), i.e. the scalar product of any two base vectors taken from different bases is equal to 1/ √ N . The problem of construction of the complete set of MUBs in the Hilbert space of an arbitrary dimension has not been solved yet [3] . Presently it is known how to construct complete set of MUB in spaces of dimension being a power of prime. It has been also proved that at least three MUB exists in spaces with N ≥ 2. In the following analysis it will be assumed that Alice randomly selects between two MUBs, i.e. computational basis and the one obtained by QFT.
Lets consider a basis obtained from the computational one by QFT
where ω N = exp (2π j/N ). It can be easily shown that | x k |l | 2 = 1/N and
Thus if Alice measures eigenvalue corresponding the state |x k , the collapse causes the home qudit will be in the state |x N −k and the result of Bob's measurement is fully determined. The Eve's attack operator observed in the new base takes the form
where the elements of the new matrix representation are given as
is a non-detection probability in the new basis. It follows that if a non-detection probability in the computational basis equals to one a n,l 2 = δ n,l than in the new base the attack will be detected with probability 1 − c l,l 2 = (N − 1)/N -an attack undetectable in one basis is detected with a high probability in the second. Thus, Alice and Bob can implement more efficient eavesdropping detection. Let us consider the case when Bob "sends" |0 . In control mode Alice randomly selects measurement basis. If ν is a fraction of control modes executed in the |x k basis then the long term non-detection probability equals to
However, the non-detection probabilities in bases under consideration are related as follows
The non detection probability c 0,0 2 in the x basis is maximal when all coefficients a 0,n are in phase. Again, lets consider distribution (13) and assume that all coefficients are real. The long term non-detection probability is then represented by the function
where p = a 0,0 2 is a non-detection probability in computational base. It follows from symmetry conditions that an eavesdropping is detected with highest probability when bases are selected equally frequently in the control mode. In this case the long term non-detection probability does not exceed the upper bound d max = ( √ 1/N + 1)/2 and that maximal value is achieved for p max = ( √ 1/N + 1)/2. It follows that Eve never intercepts more than
bits. Values of I max AE (d max ) are also marked on Fig. 2 . Eve's information as a function function of the long term probability for the considered values of N = 3, 4, 5 are presented on Fig. 2 . It follows that in the worst case Eve can still access all the information posted by Alice. It is visible that d max is an upper bound on the long term non-detection probability. Thus, Eve's attack is always detected with non-zero probability when two bases are used in control mode. An eavesdropping detection preformed in many subsequent control mode cycles provides asymptotic protocol security. Moreover, the maximum probability of non-detection gets lower as the dimension of a qudit is enlarged, and the given security level is reached faster.
Conclusion
The numerical experiments and theoretical analysis reveal a tradeoff between an eavesdropping detectability and an information leakage. The maximal intercepted information is equal to the total channel capacity and the probability of a non-detection of such attack is diminished as the number of available states of the signal particle is enlarged. However, the control mode using only the computational basis is not sufficient, as in this case Eve can reproduce half of the message content and stay undetected what renders protocol insecurity. The presented results prove that problem is resolved when at least two mutually unbiased bases are used in control mode. For an optimal eavesdropping detectability bases should be selected with equal probability. In this case attacks are detected with probability not less than 1 − d ( p max ) = (1 − 1/ √ N )/2 and an eavesdropper's information gain for the least detectable attacks cannot exceed the value given by (23) . The usage of multiple MUBs guarantees protocol quasi security, that is, there exists finite nonzero probability that an eavesdropper intercepts some part of the message without being detected. Some additional message processing analogous to privacy amplification in QKD protocols is required [9, 15] to improve protocol security profile.
The method presented herein can be applied not only to variants when one qudit particle is used for signaling, but also, almost without any modifications, to schemes based on multiple qubits and GHZ states. The approach seems to be very useful, as the QSCD protocols are one of the most actively developed branches of quantum cryptography and protocols conforming to the ping-pong paradigm are very popular among them [17] . 
